Economic Theory, Decision Theory and Experimental Economics Seminar

## **Mechanism Design With Ambiguous Communication Devices**

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## **Abstract**

This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity-sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. We prove a revelation principle for the partial implementation of social choice functions by ambiguous mechanisms.

We then revisit the classical monopolistic screening problem and show that ex-post full surplus extraction is possible, even when there is no exante ambiguity.

Keywords: Mechanism design, ambiguity, revelation principle, communication device, multiple priors.

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