In many matching markets, matches are formed after costly interviews. We analyze the welfare implications of costly interviewing in a model of worker-firm matching. We examine the trade-offs between a centralized matching system and a decentralized one, where matches can occur at any time. Centralized matching with a common offer date leads to coordination issues in the interview stage. Each firm must incorporate the externality imposed by the interview decisions of the firms ranked above it when deciding on its interview list. As a result, low-ranked firms often fail to interview some candidates that ex-ante have high match quality. In a decentralized setting with exploding offers, the set of candidates who receive interviews differs, but the welfare generated is weakly greater than in the centralized setting. Total welfare is highest with a system that ensures firms interview and match in sequence, clearing the market for the next firm. Such asynchronicity reduces interview congestion. This system can be implemented by encouraging top firms to interview and match early and allowing candidates to renege on offers.

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