Martin Peitz - Product Recommendations and Price Parity Clauses

Seminars - Applied Microeconomics
Speakers
Martin Peitz, University of Mannheim
12:30 - 13:45
Alberto Alesina Seminar Room 5-E4-SR04 - Floor 5 - via Roentgen 1
Max-0062

Paper joint with Anton Sobolev (University of Mannheim).

 

Abstract:

A seller can offer an experience good directly to consumers and indirectly through an intermediary. When selling indirectly, the intermediary provides recommendations based on the consumer’s match value and the prices at which the product is sold. The intermediary faces the trade-off between extracting rents from consumers who strongly care about the match value versus providing less informative recommendations but also serving consumers who do not. We analyze the allocative and welfare effects of prohibiting price parity clauses and/or regulating the intermediary’s recommender system. Prohibiting price parity clauses is always welfare decreasing in our model.

 

For further information please contact: giovanna.tramontano@unibocconi.it